ELIMINATE CORRUPTION AT ALL LEVELS

Monday, October 6, 2008


Driving Hyundai Into A Corner?

The authorities are minimising the gravity of the alleged cheating by Hyundai India, in underpricing cars and parts sold to its Korean parent, reports PC VINOJ
CARMAKER HYUNDAI has run into trouble after a Central Excise official accused it of cheating the government of an estimated Rs 3,000 crore in foreign exchange by undervaluing exports to its parent company. Manufacturing out of Sriperumbudur near Chennai, Hyundai Motor India is the country’s second-largest carmaker, selling about 3.3 lakh cars in 2007, of which about 50 percent were exports. Hyundai’s troubles with Central Excise Superintendent Samuel Wilson go back to 2004 when Wilson allegedly detected the company exporting cars and automobile components to its Korean parent company and other group entities at low prices. These were sometimes even below production cost, in violation of customs and excise rules and the Foreign Exchange Management Act.
Documents available with TEHELKA indicate that Wilson informed his seniors, but the department did not order an investigation. Based on Wilson’s reports, however, Fifth Pillar, a Chennai-based anti-corruption movement, has filed a case in the Madras High Court seeking a direction to the Revenue Department to take action against Hyundai. “It is one of the biggest scams in Indian corporate history. Top Revenue Department officials are in nexus with Hyundai to suppress the issue,” says activist T. Retna Pandian, who filed the petition.
According to Wilson, he got wind of the irregularities one month into his posting as superintendent of Central Excise, Poonamallee IV range. TEHELKA has a copy of the letter he wrote to Hyundai on August 9, 2004 — OC No:255/256/2004 — seeking clarifications on its exports pricing. The letter states: “It is observed from your export documents for thepast two years and also the present year, that you have been exporting cars, engine assemblies and spare parts to your parent company, viz., Hyundai Motor Corporation, Korea, and other group companies at nearly half the value of the cost of production.” The letter notes that the export price of a Santro in 2004 was less than the cost of producing a basic model of the car by sums ranging between Rs 58,000 and Rs 73,000. In the case of the Accent model, the difference ranged between Rs 1.22 lakh and Rs 1.49 lakh. Exported Santro engines were priced at $819.6 (approximately Rs 39,700 according to the then value), whereas the company had sold a defective engine of the same type for Rs 58,140 in the Indian market during the relevant period. The letter further points out that Hyundai was exporting engines for the Getz — a costlier model than the Santro — at $650 (at that time around Rs 30,000), far lower than even the Santro engine export price of $2,611 (then about Rs 1,25,200).
Hyundai’s reply was evasive, says Wilson. So, he wrote them another letter, reiterating the company’s violation of the rules. He also infor - med his senior, the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Poonamallee Division, and submitted about 30 documents to back his claim. The documents, copies of which are with TEHELKA, seek to establish the vast difference between Hyundai’s export invoices and the cost of its cars as furnished by it to the Excise Department. For instance, in a statement to the department regarding its 2002-03 prices for cars, Hyundai had quoted the price of the Accent GVS as Rs 3.51 lakh. But the car’s price was lower by about a lakh, in an application to the Excise Department (No MC-00200029/02-03, dated September 12, 2002), related to exports to group company Hyundai Motor Algerie in Algeria.
In December that year, Wilson wrote again to his immediate boss about the violations, and suggested that an investigation be ordered. It was more than a year before he received a reply,dated February 7, 2006, in which the officer quoted the commissioner’s observation on the matter. “What is the issue from the Central Excise angle? If there is no Central Excise angle, why in the first place an investigation was commenced by the division/range?”
AFTER HIS seniors didn’t support him, Wilson shot off letters to the Prime Minister, the Union Finance Minister and the Chairman of the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC). In a letter on July 29, 2006, he apprised them of the issues in contention and pleaded for “appropriate action”. Two months later, he received a reply from Rahul Nangare, an Under Secretary in the CBEC, asking him to meet the Chief Commisioner, Central Excise, Chennai. But when Wilson met him, he was allegedly informed that the CBEC had already decided there was nothing in the issues he had raised. Wilson then approached the Central Public Information Officer under the Right to Information Act, and requested information regarding the action taken on his report to the Prime Minister and its present status. If the file was closed, he wanted to know the basis on which it had been done and the details of the order, along with the file notings.
The response he got was shocking. In a letter dated February 26, 2007, an official, Kamal Dayani, noted that Wilson’s petition “could not be acted upon as it got mixed up with other papers and could not be readily located”. He was advised to contact the Revenue Department on the matter. After a series of letters, Sushil Solanki, Commissioner, CBEC, New Delhi, wrote that Wilson’s representation did not stand the scrutiny of law. Added to this was the observation of Jayendranath, Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Chennai, who said that the “price variation between domestic clearances and exports is due to several duty concessions that accrue (to Hyundai) while exporting cars. Further, it is the prevalent practice adopted by most manufacturers-exporters to price their export at a competitive price, which is less than the domestic price.”
Wilson told TEHELKA, “It is a clever way of sidetracking the issue. I have always stated that the issue in contention relates to Hyundai’s export to parent and associate companies at below-production price, which is illegal. If it had exported cars to other parties at lower prices, it wouldn’t have been illegal.” Having ruffled too many feathers in the department, Wilson is now banking on legal and moral support from Fifth Pillar. According to activist lawyer Su Srivinvasan, who is appearing in the case on Fifth Pillar’s behalf, the case is due for hearing any day now, but none of the respondents had filed their counter affidavits even two months after notices were issued to them.
Jayendranath was not available when TEHELKA contacted his office. His secretary said DP Naidu, Additional Commissioner, Large Tax Payers Unit, was the officer dealing with Hyundai and directed Wilson to contact him. When contacted, Naidu refused to comment, saying the matter was in court. Hyundai Deputy General Manager (Corporate Communication), Rajiv Mitra, told TEHELKA: “The matter was investigated by the Commissioner of Excise and Customs and also by the Revenue Department. All allegations were found to be baseless. We consider these to be reliable and impartial authorities, and hence we do not feel that there is further need to comment on the matter.”
WRITER’S EMAIL
vinoj@tehelka.com
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 38, Dated Sept 27, 2008

Sunday, September 28, 2008

Corruption in India and its remedies


In terms of changing public perception of corruption as a low-risk, high-reward activity to a high-risk, low-reward activity, India just has to make strong determination to combat corruption, given the various legislations and its legal structure.


HIGH LEVELS of corruption and its fallouts can be reduced only when an adequate anti-corruption strategy is made effective through strong political and bureaucratic will. And for this, the root causes of corruption have first to be diagnosed, and then eliminated or minimized. The root cause of bureaucratic corruption in the case of India and a few other Asian countries (Indonesia and China) basically originate from opportunities provided by the involvement of civil servants in the administration’s control, and final disposal of lucrative activities, disproportionate salaries, and weak and ineffective policing in terms of detection and the consequent punishments.


Apart from these causes, the politician-criminal-bureaucrat nexus existing merely for individual gain and survival, and for expanding their tentacles all over and showing no sincerity and reverence towards values, is also a crucial debilitating factor.

 

Apart from learning from the experience of other countries (like Singapore, the least corrupt country in Asia), in terms of changing public perception of corruption as ’a low-risk, high-reward’ activity to ’a high-risk, low-reward’ activity, and also basing the comprehensive anti-corruption strategy on the ’logic of corruption control’ in terms of focusing on the removal or minimization of incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt, India just has to have strong determination to combat corruption, given the various legislations and its legal structure.

 

The only thing, which has to be ensured is proper, impartial, and unbiased use of various anti-corruption Acts to take strong, deterrent prompt and timely legal action against the offenders, irrespective of their political/bureaucratic connections, and money or muscle power.


Beyond that there is a widespread perception, and it is also widely seen in everyday life that India is increasingly becoming a soft state in terms of postponing or ignoring, diplomatically, the use or application of the given legal sanctions or discretions, if any, in crucial matters. This attitude requires a paradigm change starting with a tough treatment (within the given framework) of anyone involved directly or indirectly in corrupt practices.

 

The law enforcement authorities also have a crucial role to play in this context. Presently, they are viewed with suspicion. They have to evoke faith, not terror and have to change their mindset to be fully accountable to generate public confidence. Judiciary, which is presently under great strain, has to provide speedier and less expensive justice by enhancing its infrastructure and incorporating modern methods to activate the whole procedure.

 

These prescriptions combined with strong and undaunted political will and long-period macro anti-corruption strategy, will no doubt make India, in time to come, a less corruption-free society, and once the beginning is made, the end result would be highly rewarding.

 

 

CJ: Vinod Anand  (meri news)

 

 

Saturday, September 27, 2008

State Vigilance departments should be made independent bodies

 

Ludhiana, September 20 The Anti-Corruption Federation of India (TACFI) has decided to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court for declaring the state vigilance departments as independent bodies. This was announced by Neeraj Chawla, the national president of TACFI, while addressing a press conference on Saturday.

Chawla said, “The state vigilance bodies should be made independent just like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). They should also be trained on the lines of the CBI.” The vigilance bodies presently work under their respective state governments.

When asked if the state governments were using the vigilance departments as a tool for setting scores with rival political parties, he said, “It is quite evident.”

He said that corruption had to be controlled from the grassroots level and moreover at an individual level. Chawla said, “Corruption is growing at a rapid pace. TACFI cannot control it all alone.”

 

Indian Express Sep 21,2008

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

HUMAN CHAIN FOR FREEDOM FROM CORRUPTION


   “Encourage, Enable and Empower Every Citizen of India to Eliminate Corruption at All Levels of Society”

HUMAN CHAIN

FOR

“FREEDOM FROM CORRUPTION”

 On Thursday October 2nd 2008 at 9 am 

 Venue: Marina Beach (Service Road), Chennai.

 Opp to Vivekanandar Illam (Near Kannagi Statue)






Come and join hands with us in the fight against corruption

 

Say NO to BRIBE. Use ZERO Rupee Note. Make use of RTI.

2008 Corruption Perception Index

2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX

country
rank

                   country

2008 CPI 
score

surveys
used

confidence range

1

Denmark

9,3

6

9.1 - 9.4

1

New Zealand

9,3

6

9.2 - 9.5

1

Sweden

9,3

6

9.2 - 9.4

4

Singapore

9,2

9

9.0 - 9.3

5

Finland

9,0

6

8.4 - 9.4

5

Switzerland

9,0

6

8.7 - 9.2

7

Iceland

8,9

5

8.1 - 9.4

7

Netherlands

8,9

6

8.5 - 9.1

9

Australia

8,7

8

8.2 - 9.1

9

Canada

8,7

6

8.4 - 9.1

11

Luxembourg

8,3

6

7.8 - 8.8

12

Austria

8,1

6

7.6 - 8.6

12

Hong Kong

8,1

8

7.5 - 8.6

14

Germany

7,9

6

7.5 - 8.2

14

Norway

7,9

6

7.5 - 8.3

16

Ireland

7,7

6

7.5 - 7.9

16

United Kingdom

7,7

6

7.2 - 8.1

18

Belgium

7,3

6

7.2 - 7.4

18

Japan

7,3

8

7.0 - 7.6

18

USA

7,3

8

6.7 - 7.7

21

Saint Lucia

7,1

3

6.6 - 7.3

22

Barbados

7,0

4

6.5 - 7.3

23

Chile

6,9

7

6.5 - 7.2

23

France

6,9

6

6.5 - 7.3

23

Uruguay

6,9

5

6.5 - 7.2

26

Slovenia

6,7

8

6.5 - 7.0

27

Estonia

6,6

8

6.2 - 6.9

28

Qatar

6,5

4

5.6 - 7.0

28

Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines

6,5

3

4.7 - 7.3

28

Spain

6,5

6

5.7 - 6.9

31

Cyprus

6,4

3

5.9 - 6.8

32

Portugal

6,1

6

5.6 - 6.7

33

Dominica

6,0

3

4.7 - 6.8

33

Israel

6,0

6

5.6 - 6.3

35

United Arab Emirates

5,9

5

4.8 - 6.8

36

Botswana

5,8

6

5.2 - 6.4

36

Malta

5,8

4

5.3 - 6.3

36

Puerto Rico

5,8

4

5.0 - 6.6

39

Taiwan

5,7

9

5.4 - 6.0

40

South Korea

5,6

9

5.1 - 6.3

41

Mauritius

5,5

5

4.9 - 6.4

41

Oman

5,5

5

4.5 - 6.4

43

Bahrain

5,4

5

4.3 - 5.9

43

Macao

5,4

4

3.9 - 6.2

45

Bhutan

5,2

5

4.5 - 5.9

45

Czech Republic

5,2

8

4.8 - 5.9

47

Cape Verde

5,1

3

3.4 - 5.6

47

Costa Rica

5,1

5

4.8 - 5.3

47

Hungary

5,1

8

4.8 - 5.4

47

Jordan

5,1

7

4.0 - 6.2

47

Malaysia

5,1

9

4.5 - 5.7

52

Latvia

5,0

6

4.8 - 5.2

52

Slovakia

5,0

8

4.5 - 5.3

54

South Africa

4,9

8

4.5 - 5.1

55

Italy

4,8

6

4.0 - 5.5

55

Seychelles

4,8

4

3.7 - 5.9

57

Greece

4,7

6

4.2 - 5.0

58

Lithuania

4,6

8

4.1 - 5.2

58

Poland

4,6

8

4.0 - 5.2

58

Turkey

4,6

7

4.1 - 5.1

61

Namibia

4,5

6

3.8 - 5.1

62

Croatia

4,4

8

4.0 - 4.8

62

Samoa

4,4

3

3.4 - 4.8

62

Tunisia

4,4

6

3.5 - 5.5

65

Cuba

4,3

4

3.6 - 4.8

65

Kuwait

4,3

5

3.3 - 5.2

67

El Salvador

3,9

5

3.2 - 4.5

67

Georgia

3,9

7

3.2 - 4.6

67

Ghana

3,9

6

3.4 - 4.5

70

Colombia

3,8

7

3.3 - 4.5

70

Romania

3,8

8

3.4 - 4.2

72

Bulgaria

3,6

8

3.0 - 4.3

72

China

3,6

9

3.1 - 4.3

72

Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)

3,6

6

2.9 - 4.3

72

Mexico

3,6

7

3.4 - 3.9

72

Peru

3,6

6

3.4 - 4.1

72

Suriname

3,6

4

3.3 - 4.0

72

Swaziland

3,6

4

2.9 - 4.3

72

Trinidad and Tobago

3,6

4

3.1 - 4.0

80

Brazil

3,5

7

3.2 - 4.0

80

Burkina Faso

3,5

7

2.9 - 4.2

80

Morocco

3,5

6

3.0 - 4.0

80

Saudi Arabia

3,5

5

3.0 - 3.9

80

Thailand

3,5

9

3.0 - 3.9

85

Albania

3,4

5

3.3 - 3.4

85

India

3,4

10

3.2 - 3.6

85

Madagascar

3,4

7

2.8 - 4.0

85

Montenegro

3,4

5

2-5 - 4.0

85

Panama

3,4

5

2.8 - 3.7

85

Senegal

3,4

7

2.9 - 4.0

85

Serbia

3,4

6

3.0 - 4.0

92

Algeria

3,2

6

2.9 - 3.4

92

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3,2

7

2.9 - 3.5

92

Lesotho

3,2

5

2.3 - 3.8

92

Sri Lanka

3,2

7

2.9 - 3.5

96

Benin

3,1

6

2.8 - 3.4

96

Gabon

3,1

4

2.8 - 3.3

96

Guatemala

3,1

5

2.3 - 4.0

96

Jamaica

3,1

5

2.8 - 3.3

96

Kiribati

3,1

3

2.5 - 3.4

96

Mali

3,1

6

2.8 - 3.3

102

Bolivia

3.0

6

2.8 - 3.2

102

Djibouti

3,0

4

2.2 - 3.3

102

Dominican Republic

3,0

5

2.7 - 3.2

102

Lebanon

3,0

4

2.2 - 3.6

102

Mongolia

3,0

7

2.6 - 3.3

102

Rwanda

3,0

5

2.7 - 3.2

102

Tanzania

3,0

7

2.5 - 3.3

109

Argentina

2,9

7

2.5 - 3.3

109

Armenia

2,9

7

2.6 - 3.1

109

Belize

2,9

3

1.8 - 3.7

109

Moldova

2,9

7

2.4 - 3.7

109

Solomon Islands

2,9

3

2.5 - 3.2

109

Vanuatu

2,9

3

2.5 - 3.2

115

Egypt

2,8

6

2.4 - 3.2

115

Malawi

2,8

6

2.4 - 3.1

115

Maldives

2,8

4

1.7 - 4.3

115

Mauritania

2,8

7

2.2 - 3.7

115

Niger

2,8

6

2.4 - 3.0

115

Zambia

2,8

7

2.5 - 3.0

121

Nepal

2,7

6

2.4 - 3.0

121

Nigeria

2,7

7

2.3 - 3.0

121

Sao Tome and Principe

2,7

3

2.1 - 3.1

121

Togo

2,7

6

1.9 - 3.7

121

Viet Nam

2,7

9

2.4 - 3.1

126

Eritrea

2,6

5

1.7 - 3.6

126

Ethiopia

2,6

7

2.2 - 2.9

126

Guyana

2,6

4

2.4 - 2.7

126

Honduras

2,6

6

2.3 - 2.9

126

Indonesia

2,6

10

2.3 - 2.9

126

Libya

2,6

5

2.2 - 3.0

126

Mozambique

2,6

7

2.4 - 2.9

126

Uganda

2,6

7

2.2 - 3.0

134

Comoros

2,5

3

1.9 - 3.0

134

Nicaragua

2,5

6

2.2 - 2.7

134

Pakistan

2,5

7

2.0 - 2.8

134

Ukraine

2,5

8

2.2 - 2.8

138

Liberia

2,4

4

1.8 - 2.8

138

Paraguay

2,4

5

2.0 - 2.7

138

Tonga

2,4

3

1.9 - 2.6

141

Cameroon

2,3

7

2.0 - 2.7

141

Iran

2,3

4

1.9 - 2.5

141

Philippines

2,3

9

2.1 - 2.5

141

Yemen

2,3

5

1.9 - 2.8

145

Kazakhstan

2,2

6

1.8 - 2.7

145

Timor-Leste

2,2

4

1.8 - 2.5

147

Bangladesh

2,1

7

1.7 - 2.4

147

Kenya

2,1

7

1.9 - 2.4

147

Russia

2,1

8

1.9 - 2.5

147

Syria

2,1

5

1.6 - 2.4

151

Belarus

2,0

5

1.6 - 2.5

151

Central African Republic

2,0

5

1.9 - 2.2

151

Côte d´Ivoire

2,0

6

1.7 - 2.5

151

Ecuador

2,0

5

1.8 - 2.2

151

Laos

2,0

6

1.6 - 2.3

151

Papua New Guinea

2,0

6

1.6 - 2.3

151

Taijikistan

2,0

8

1.7 - 2.3

158

Angola

1,9

6

1.5 - 2.2

158

Azerbaijan

1,9

8

1.7 - 2.1

158

Burundi

1,9

6

1.5 - 2.3

158

Congo, Republic

1,9

6

1.8 - 2.0

158

Gambia

1,9

5

1.5 - 2.4

158

Guinea-Bissau

1,9

3

1.8 - 2.0

158

Sierra Leone

1,9

5

1.8 - 2.0

158

Venezuela

1,9

7

1.8 - 2.0

166

Cambodia

1,8

7

1.7 - 1.9

166

Kyrgyzstan

1,8

7

1.7 - 1.9

166

Turkmenistan

1,8

5

1.5 - 2.2

166

Uzbekistan

1,8

8

1.5 - 2.2

166

Zimbabwe

1,8

7

1.5 - 2.1

171

Congo, Democratic Republic

1,7

6

1.6 - 1.9

171

Equatorial Guinea

1,7

4

1.5 - 1.8

173

Chad

1,6

6

1.5 - 1.7

173

Guinea

1,6

6

1.3 - 1.9

173

Sudan

1,6

6

1.5 - 1.7

176

Afghanistan

1,5

4

1.1 - 1.6

177

Haiti

1,4

4

1.1 - 1.7

178

Iraq

1,3

4

1.1 - 1.6

178

Myanmar

1,3

4

1.0 - 1.5

180

Somalia

1,0

4

0.5 - 1.4


MARCH TO MARINA


5th PILLAR INDIA

INVITES
CITIZENS INDIA
TO 
MARINA
ON 02nd October 2008

    FORM HUMAN CHAIN

YOU CAN STOP CORRUPTION

Venue: Opposite to ICE HOUSE(Vivekanandhar Ilam), Chennai 

between 0900 am and 1100 am




ZERO RUPEE NOTE




5th PILLAR INDIA

5th pillar India

5th Pillar is an organization that strongly believes that the people that make up a democracy are the strongest members of such a system. Without the people a democracy would not exist. As such, we believe that if each one of us changes our own habits, we will be attacking corruption at its roots, and corruption will cease to exist. That is why we hope that everyone who learns about the organization will take a pledge to not give or receive any bribes. By taking the pledge you are helping us reach our goal of a corruption free nation. 

Know 5th Pillar

5th Pillar is a non profit, non governmental organization aimed at fighting the evils of the Nation, corruption. The Nation already has four pillars of democracy – the legislature, executive, judiciary and the media. There is now an additional, 5th Pillar: the citizens of the Nation.


Objective

Mobilising people power and making it ‘Social Capital’ through 5th Pillar's coalition of citizens to fight corruption thereby strengthening the four pillars of democracy


Mission Statement

Encourage, Enable and Empower Every Citizen of India to Eliminate Corruption at All Levels of Society